​Orthodoxy stands at a critical juncture, demanding a remedy for the pervasive pestilence of Russkiy Mir and a profound reconsideration of the Russian Orthodox Church's standing within the broader Orthodox community. The alarming promotion of a patriarch advocating, even to vulnerable believers and children, that murder – specifically fratricide – is an acceptable means of dispute resolution presents a glaring deviation from the teachings of Christ and the foundational principles upheld by His Great Church.

​Navigating an impartial assessment devoid of tribal biases poses a formidable challenge for many. Although consensus may remain elusive, the critical imperative is to anchor our decisions in accurate facts, ensuring an informed choice rather than succumbing to the pull of any specific faction. This places us in the challenging but indispensable position of making choices grounded in knowledge and discernment. While the Russian Church plays in an ecclesiastically isolated sandbox, they and their minions like ROCOR persistently launch numerous "incorrect, groundless, and openly slanderous" accusations against the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the person of His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.

Let's engage in an earnest and illuminating examination of the behaviors of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Patriarch Kirill. Delving into these religious leaders' genuine actions and conduct, it's crucial to approach this discussion with sensitivity and objectivity, recognizing the opposing perspectives in our exploration.

​Without reservation, I assert that what is commonly referred to as the patriarch of Moscow is, in my view, a mere semblance of an Orthodox patriarch. However, to ensure that your judgment is based on factual information rather than personal bias, I present a series of actual comparative actions and quotes that contradict the prevalent narrative propagated on-line by small yet vocal Russian hierarchy, priests, monastics, and the sycophantic theological journals and websites that disseminate their views across various social media outlets.

​As disseminated by Russian sources, the simulacrum Moscow Patriarchate's propaganda asserts that the Ecumenical Patriarch's supposed ambition for global Greek hegemony and control lacks any foundation. The reality starkly contrasts the misguided declarations by Kirill and his Russkiy Mir sycophants.

Inescapably evident is the manifestation of a self-proclaimed de facto Orthodox Crusader Pope in Kirill -Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev. His overtly malevolent rhetoric, unapologetic breaches of canonical norms through ecclesiastical invasions, overt support for fratricidal wars in defiance of fundamental human and biblical values, and persistent provocation of internal conflicts within Christ's Great Church, all while brandishing the specter of "schism," form an indisputable pattern. The indomitable truth, elusive to Moscow loyalists, stands unwavering: Kirill is unequivocally unworthy.

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​With Lent on the horizon, it's time to reflect, renew, and make positive changes. I'm saddened by the Orthodox Church's current state. Some leaders speak out against the Muscovite church’s abuses, while others remain silent or even perpetuate Cyril’s malevolent phronema. 

Patriarch Bartholomew, Archbishop of Constantinople and Ecumenical Patriarch, has denounced the Patriarchate of Moscow for its attempts to “justify an unjustifiable, unholy, unprovoked, diabolical war against an independent country.” He has reminded us that “the Russian Church must share the blame for the crimes committed in Ukraine.” Despite the few rational voices within my church, silence implies approval, and I do not endorse it.

​The simulation of a Patriarch, the local bishop of Moscow, Cyril, encourages our children to murder fellow Orthodox believers, promising them martyrdom and direct entry into paradise. You may argue that he addresses only his flock, but that's a misguided perspective. There is one Church, one Chalice, and one Voice. We are the Body, not a collection of separate organs —Russian, Serbian, Albanian, Greek… What Father Andrew preaches in my neck of the woods should align with what Father Hilarion preaches in Siberia. Does it?

Autocephaly does not signify unchecked autonomy. For centuries, the status-quo Russian mindset has significantly shaped the church's agenda, tarnished the body, and contributed to the de-Hellenization of Orthodoxy. Beyond attempting to "knock the Greek out of us," they go even further, surpassing the baseless racial stereotypes laughably linked to Baklava and Gyro. Strangely, they extrapolate and assign ethno-phyletism to those whom they wrongly believe perceive them as inferior—a manifestation of a “woke Napoleon complex.”

Hellenism refers to the cultural, philosophical, and artistic traditions that emerged in ancient Greece and Rome. The ideals of Hellenism encompassed a broad range of principles and values that profoundly impacted the development of Western civilization. Orthodoxy gestated within the realm of Hellenism, undergoing a mystical metamorphosis that subsequently turned the cosmos into a sacred space, shaping the earth into the field of salvation.

​Orthodoxy, particularly Eastern Roman Christianity, has been influenced by Hellenistic ideals in various ways, given the historical and cultural context of the Roman (Byzantine) Empire and the convergence of Greek philosophical thought with Christian theology. 

​​Here are some critical aspects of Hellenistic ideals transfigured by Orthodoxy:

​Orthodoxy is "Hellenic," not ethnically Greek, as some charlatans would mislead you to believe. Russians began imposing Russkiy Mir: a standardization according to Russian norms, not Orthodox norms. Before these intentional innovations, stepping into any Orthodox church worldwide would reveal nearly identical worship services, spaces, and phronema, differing only in the vernacular. 

​For example, instead of Tchaikovsky or Rachmaninoff’s Divine Liturgies… Orthodoxy echoed those musical compositions of St. Romanos the Melodist (circa 490–556), St. John of Damascus (676–749), St. Kassia (circa 810–867), and St. Gerasimos Mikragiannanitis (1905-1991). All revered composers whose hymn compositions still resonate within all the expressions of the Eastern Orthodox Church. 

​Even mentioning the Russian choral tradition, which has seeped into many traditions, is foreign to our genuine Orthodox expression; it triggers an inflated and demeaning response from even the most meager individuals. These misguided Russian innovations in art, architecture, music, spiritual phronema, and even Ecumenical Canons and ecclesiology threaten to fragment our unified Orthodox Tradition.

​The Orthodox Deplorables, Instigators of Schism

Throughout the annals of Church history, ecclesiastic unity persisted even in the face of acknowledged errors, ecclesiological disparities, and doctrinal heresy. Unity is a paramount virtue of Orthodoxy, a straightforward concept that Moscow appears to struggle with.

Orthodoxy, the timeless beacon of wisdom, in Russian hands will be reduced to a flickering candle in the hands of those who seem to mistake obscurity for enlightenment.

PDF Available at Academia.com 
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Historical Orthodox Unity

The ecclesiastical landscape has been marked by phenomena such as Nestorianism (386–451), iconoclasm (717–787), filioque (begun in the 6th century and was not the cause of original West/East schism), uncanonical Russian unilateral expansionism into Asia and North America (1300-1945), Bulgarian phyletism (1872), and the heresy of Sergianism (1927). Today, the Sergian heresy continues and is presented as Russkiy Mir. Throughout these debates and conflicts, the Ecumenical Patriarchate ensured Orthodox unity persevered, with the constant and notable exception being Moscow’s provocations.

Beginning in the 19th century and further complicating our understanding of proper Orthodox ecclesiology is the development of “national” churches (Greece in 1833, Serbia in 1875, Romania in 1885, and Poland in 1924) by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, these ostensibly "novel" territorial ecclesiastical entities did not transgress the ecclesiological tenet prescribing a singular bishop or church within a given geographical territory, in accordance with prevailing ecumenical council norms.

In the face of the Ottoman Empire's decline, often called the "sick man of Europe" – a reminder that this encompassed all Orthodox churches except Russia – the Ecumenical Patriarchate displayed self-sacrifice, playing a pivotal role in preserving the unity of the Great Church of Christ during an exceptionally challenging period in human history. This starkly contrasts Moscow's approach, resembling a leviathan that inclines towards invasion, conquest, and absorption of all it can. When unable to achieve its goals through force or military attack, it resorts to accusations of heresy and creates schisms, opening the way for ecclesiastical invasion.

It is crucial to emphasize that the condemnation of heretical doctrines is a prerogative reserved for an Ecumenical Council rather than individual patriarchs, local bishops, priests, or monastics/laypersons. While these individuals may articulate dissent, apprehension, or objection to perceived transgressions, the imperative remains to avoid instigating schisms and seek resolution through proper ecclesiastical channels; the emphasis is “proper ecclesial channels.” 

Moscow Patriarch’s opposition to the principle of unity

Let me expound upon the many various blasphemous strategies employed by the Muscovite church throughout its historical trajectory, including tactics such as coercive measures for patriarchal dignity (abduction of Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah, blackmail in 1589), imprisonment for nonconformity (St Maximos Vatopedianos 1515-1556), unilaterally self-declaring autocephaly in (1917, Tikhon / 1943, Stalin), utilizing bribery for international influence (Jerusalem, Antioch, Albania…), the illicit uncanonical conferral of autocephaly in 1971, and engaging in petulant schisms with threats of a disruptive nature in Estonia and Ukraine.

The Ukrainian invasion is not unusual for the Russian Orthodox Church, which historically consistently exhibits unwavering support for the Kremlin's military campaigns and usually instigates conflict against any Orthodox nation for its self-interest (Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Africa, etc). Rather than displaying any hesitation, the ROC's backing of conflicts has not only endured but has intensified as the wars unfolded. One cannot help but marvel at the local Moscow bishop's chutzpa and steadfast commitment to sever ties with Orthodoxy for self-serving non-dogmatic issues consistently. This demonstrates a notable pattern of petulant divergence from unity in the broader Orthodox community and norms (canons).

The origins of the contemporary Russian propagandistic narrative can be traced back to the incestuous relationship between the Moscow church and state. This intertwining is exemplified by the zealous political and ecclesial Russian aspirations to attain Constantinople's prestige and prerogatives. The pursuit of geographic and ecclesial advantages has led to the prolonged intricacies surrounding the protracted Turko-Russian Wars (1568–1570, 1735-1739, 1806-1829, 1877–1878, and 1914 with the Russian invasion of Turkish Armenia). Indeed, each war was characterized by the deliberate flouting of canonical norms, notably evident in the case of Bulgaria. 

This Russo-centric narrative gained traction and increased with the inception of the Russian Church outside of Russia, culminating in unparalleled levels of misinformation and distorted disinformation. With the endorsement of Stalin, the propaganda campaign for Russian Orthodox hegemony worldwide escalated significantly, further fueling the false narratives of supremacy. This trend persisted throughout the 20th century, creating a landscape where distinguishing between canonical practices and those antithetical to the Orthodox ethos remains increasingly challenging for many.

The intricate historical path has added complexity, making distinguishing authentic Orthodox principles from the shroud of manipulated Russian information challenging. This conflation within the Russian Mir is a potent tool in shaping public opinion, fostering a distorted comprehension of the multifaceted and nuanced concerns within the ecclesiastical realm. 

​Today’s social media Russkiy Mir Pundits

I am inclined to redirect attention to the contemporary landscape, precisely the phenomenon of social media propagandists and the purported "useful idiots" affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate. This group has tended to amalgamate disparate and weighty issues into a propagandistic narrative, utilizing sentimental contemporary views of morals and ethics. This approach effectively constructs a feast of red meat tropes, custom-tailored for consumption by individuals predisposed to phyletic inclinations, all while overlooking the foundational ethos of Orthodoxy. This encompasses the Russian Orthodox substratum, characterized by virtue-signaling proselytes, purportedly adhering to genuine Orthodoxy.

Let's delve into the specific group called the "orthodox deplorables." The conventional straw-man lamenters, in rhetorical terms, go beyond just figures like the lead Karens such as George Malakalopoulos and Nick Skatamatakis. It also includes diverse individuals, like cybernetic convert right-leaning pundits and pseudo-zealot theologians such as Peter Heers, George Maximov, Jay Dyer, Jesse Dominic, Jim Jatras, and John Whiteford.

​Behold the trio of discontented Greeks – George Michalopoulos, Jim Jatras, and Nick Stamatakis. Like intertwined olives in a tightly packed jar hoping to be noticed, they move in lockstep, their camaraderie as seamless as a well-rehearsed Zorba dance, sharing a bond tighter than a stubborn jar of honey in the Greek sun. They're not just three peas in a pod; they're like gyro slices flavor-fully marinating each other in the juices of shared opinions and mutual admiration. It's a friendship seasoned with a pinch of sarcasm and a drop of Ouzo, leaving the rest of us to marvel at the magnificence of their Hellenic unity. Opa! They revel in the delightful echo chamber of their solidarity, a symphony of self-stimulation that provides an unparalleled rush of validation. Their modus operandi? A merry-go-round of quoting and promoting each other's journalistic endeavors, a delightful dance of feeble attempts that could make even the most stoic critic crack a smile. It's a small world they've crafted. Cheers to this trio for turning self-stimulation into an art form!

​George Michalopoulos dubiously asserts himself as a self-proclaimed solitary champion of Orthodoxy. Jorge decided to part ways with the ethnic Greek church, transforming into the lonesome gladiator tilting at windmills alongside his spouse, Gail, the eternal convert. “Bartholomew split the Russian Church”

The transformation of Jim Jatras, once a political insider, is now seemingly on a perpetual quest for validation. His verbal escapades include gems like "Constantinople centralized power, throwing the Church into discord, especially the Russian Church." Ah, the profound musings of a modern-day philosopher! It's almost as if he's attempting to rewrite history with the flair of a Shakespearean drama, casting Constantinople as the grand villain in the Church's soap opera of discord. Bravo, Jim, for turning the intricacies of ecclesiastical politics into a tale worthy of a Greek tragedy, complete with plot twists and the quest for eternal validation. 

Meanwhile, Nick, a seemingly clueless figure in ecclesiastical matters, struts around as a Protestant Christian defending Orthodoxy from its hierarchy... However, his primary dedication purports to stand up for Hellenism. His ethos is “do nothing but tear down.” Stamatakis’ feigned interest in the Church serves as an anemic endeavor at character assassination, which he hasn’t entirely perfected yet, but he muddles on preaching to the disappointed. 

In a move befitting tabloid journalism, their escapades unfold like a soap opera in the realm of disgruntled Greek dynamics. The following individuals, all hail from the Russian Orthodox Church in and Outside Russia (ROCOR) bearers of enlightenment from Russia, appear to foster animosity, discord, and division. Here are purported pearls of wisdom that reveal the caliber of their intellects and the nature of their hearts. These fine specimens are like a philosophical puzzle, inviting us to ponder the age-old question: just how much poison can one stomach before it becomes downright deleterious? They perform a delicate dance, a waltz with toxicity, where the line between critique and calamity blurs. It's almost as if they've taken a sip from the cup of controversy and decided to chug the entire brew.

I leave you with the riddle: at what point does one say to the spirit of the Antichrist, 
"That's enough poison for me, thank you!"

“The Patriarch of Constantinople is introducing division by preaching heresy.”
"canons are self-actualizing magical spells."​
"no longer do we recognize Christ in this local church it’s no longer confessing the faith."
"non-participation of all bishops was phyletistic opportunism."
"The Council of Crete is neither great, nor holy, nor Pan-Orthodox."
"support of the Russian State for embattled Orthodox peoples,"
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"Heers is a priest without a bishop. This lack of canonical oversight suggests he is without antimins as well.  Perhaps this is the reason why Heers has turned to the digital Orthodox world to serve as his de facto parish."
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In his ignoble quest for influence, he’s mastered the art of expulsion, treating it as a sacrament. Anyone not adhering to his rigid interpretation of Orthodoxy is promptly shown the door as if the pearly gates were under their jurisdiction. Jay is a repository of countless ignorant commentaries. Instead of delving into the vast sea of his dubious insights, let's turn to the words of another who has dared to encapsulate the essence of this individual: “Dyer is nothing more than a conspiracy theorist and huckster, dabbling in a wide net of subjects to gain access to as many honeypots as possible.”

“Patriarch of Alexandria Theodoros serves with schismatic hierarchs in Constantinople.”
“it can be reasonably suggested that Constantinople has lowered its initial expectations.”
“Constantinople expects Churches to serve with schismatics.”
"soon after I converted I found the Old Calendarist groups who proclaim that they have preserved the truth even more fully than had the historic Orthodox Churches — they appealed to my desire for truth."
"this clique to “rubber stamp” the changes to Orthodox ecclesiology"
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To these pseudo-Orthodox internet trailblazers, everyone is conveniently sorted into neat, demeaning groups with labels. They’ll feel justified by what they read. You're either an "Ecumenist" or a member of the elusive "new world order." If that's not enough, they've expanded their vocabulary to include less-than-flattering terms like "queer" and the mysterious "Fordhamite." In what appears to be derogatory attempts to demean the Ecumenical Patriarchate, they’ve even labeled me “Istanbul Elias,” a snub ROCOR’s shiny star, Fr. John has chosen to attribute to me, and yet I wear it with pride. 

My team has developed a website, Istanbulelias.com, to showcase the insults directed at me which is expanding to showcase how they verbally abuse others in the blogoshere. Illustrating the Russian church’s limited scope of attack and inability of small-minded sycophants  sharing Russian style christian love online. 

In Conclusion

These individuals never seem to engage with the substance of an argument; instead, they opt for a repertoire of insults directed at the messenger. The Russian circus continues, with the clowns choosing insults over genuine discourse. Indeed, the landscape of the Orthodox internet is evolving, thanks to this new wave of virtuous vigilantes the discourse ain’t pretty. As they wield their labels and moral doctrines with zeal, one can't help but marvel at the audacity of their blameless Russian crusade. 

The self-percieved gatekeepers of the virtuous Orthodox internet! Press them a tad, and you're swiftly escorted to the exit like an uninvited guest at a righteous banquet. It's a delicate dance, navigating the hallowed halls of their digital sanctum, where questioning their moral fortress is akin to heresy. In this virtuous haven, dissent is not tolerated; it's promptly labeled as an unholy intrusion. 

The irony is palpable. While they champion the virtues of a fascistic Orthodoxy, their intolerance for questioning mirrors the very authoritarianism they claim to despise. Their moral high ground is perched atop a digital soapbox, and any probing questions threaten to crumble the foundation. So, to those valiant gatekeepers, as you wield your virtual expulsion hammer with psuedo-righteousness, may you find solace in the Orthodox Church endowed by the Ecumenical Councils. 

Above all, unity in the Orthodox faith.  ​

The Kariye Djami -From Byzantine Sanctuary to Controversial Mosque
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The Kariye Djami, originally known as the Chora Monastery or the Monastery of Christ (Μονή του Χριστού της Χώρα), stands as a captivating symbol of Istanbul's rich history. Nestled in the Roman Capital, Constantinople, present-day Istanbul, Türkiye, this ancient structure resides near the Charisios Gate (Edirnekapı) and south of the Palace of the Porphyrogenitus (Tekfur Sarayı). The term "chora" (χώρα), suggesting "land" or "in the country," resonates with the rural nature of its location, originally beyond the city walls constructed by Constantine. The site likely remained sparsely populated even during the Ottoman era, contributing to the mystery surrounding Chora's early history.

​According to one tradition, the relics of St. Babylas are believed to have been located at Chora in the early 4th century. "Chora" takes on a mystical interpretation, signifying a "dwelling place." Inscriptions on the adornments within the monastery depict Christ as "the land of the living" and the Virgin as "the container of the uncontainable," cleverly playing on the word "chora."

The Kariye Djami's rich history unfolds in a series of transformative epochs:

4th-century Foundation upon Older Ruins: The monastery traces its roots back to the 4th century, established upon ancient ruins, marking the beginning of its historical journey.

11th Century: Maria Doukaina's Architectural Renovation: Maria Doukaina, mother-in-law of Roman (Byzantine) emperor Alexius I Comnenus, reconstructed the Chora Church in the architectural style of an inscribed cross or quincunx during the 11th century, aligning with contemporary trends.

14th Century: Archon Theodore Metochites' Artistic Legacy: Archon Theodore Metochites significantly enhanced the church's aesthetic appeal between 1315 and 1321, contributing exquisite mosaics and frescoes, showcasing the finest example of the Palaeologian Renaissance in mosaic art. His dual role as a classical scholar and statesman adds a unique layer to Chora's history.

15th Century: Conversion into Kariye Camii: In the aftermath of the Fall of the Roman (Byzantine) Empire in 1453, Hadım Ali Pasha, Grand Vizier of Sultan Bayezid II, ordered the conversion of the famed Chora Monastery into Kariye Camii, emphasizing the term kariye's Greek origins.

1945–2020: Museum, Art Restoration, and Controversies: Designated as a museum in 1945, the Kariye Djami underwent restoration efforts sponsored by American scholars in 1948. Since 1511, serving as a mosque, the building ceased functioning as such, opening its doors to the public as Kariye Museum in 1958. Controversies surrounding its status emerged, leading to a lawsuit in 2005. On November 11, 2019, Türkiye's highest administrative court issued an order to reverse the Kariye Djami to a mosque. This decision was subsequently implemented through a presidential decree, officially changing its status to a mosque. The decree was promulgated and recorded in the Official Gazette on August 21, 2020. This administrative and legal process marked a significant milestone in the recent history of the Kariye Djami, transitioning it from a museum back into a mosque and not its original church... 

​During the late 19th century, the Chora, renowned for its intricate mosaics, gained popularity among Western tourists and acquired the moniker "Mosaic Mosque." In 1945, it underwent a transformative shift when it was converted into a museum under the jurisdiction of the Ayasofya Museum. The Byzantine Institute of America, followed by the Dumbarton Oaks Field Committee in 1947, initiated extensive conservation efforts, including cleaning mosaics and frescoes and overall building restoration. This “museum” decision sparked debate within Türkiye, with proponents viewing it as a progressive step toward global engagement. At the same time, critics, mainly conservatives and nationalists, considered it a concession to the West and a dilution of Muslim identity. 

These sentiments never evaporated, and in 2020, amidst challenging political and economic troubles, the Chora underwent an official conversion back into a mosque despite currently being closed with a proposed reopening in May 2024; rumors attach date selected to coincide with historical commemorations.

The recent reconversion has sparked debates and criticism, with accusations of political maneuvering. The sudden pearl-clutching from individuals with ulterior motives isn’t as astonishing as it might first appear. These people throughout history use these bouts of “human rights” virtue-signaling skills to showcase their own personal agendas. These are the same individuals who will feign shock over the conversion of a museum into a mosque and will excoriate Ataturk who converted the mosque into a museum.

​The fact that Recep Tayyip Erdogan doesn’t need this former tiny church/museum as a mosque is evident by his major mosque-building projects in Istanbul and around Türkiye. For example, the largest mosque in the world, Grand Camlica Mosque, just 20.0 km away from Kariye, where 63 thousand people can perform prayers at the same time, or in the Shadow of Orthodoxy’s Holy Trinity Cathedral, the new Taxsim mosque, which can hold up to 3,000 worshippers at the same time and is only 4 km away from Kariye. 

​The tumult surrounding Hagia Sophia and Chora are orchestrated, serving as a poignant reminder of historical conquests and reflecting a provocative stance towards Western civilization and Christianity from a fundamental Islamist perspective. The orchestration is attributed to political expediency by Erdogan, capitalizing on the situation, and leveraged by critics, particularly detractors from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 

​This reversion is far from unique; numerous churches in Istanbul have undergone a similar transformation into mosques. Having visited most of them, here are the most notable churches currently repurposed as mosques:

• Hagia Eirene (Armory but not mosque)
• Sergius & Bacchus (Küçük Ayasofya Mosque)
• Myrelaion (Bodrum Mosque)
• Theotokos Kyriotissa (Kalenderhane Mosque)
• Holy Theodoros (Vefa Kilise Mosque)
• Pantocrator Monastery (Zeyrek Mosque)

​I find myself reflecting on whether those who feign zealotry for "Orthodoxy" will scrutinize Russian fratricide or condemn the Bulgarians for the disheartening thefts from the Eikosiphinisa Monastery. Similarly, will they blame the Greek government for the situation surrounding the Dafni Monastery Museum? Moreover, one cannot overlook Greece's apparent failure to secure Mount Athos. The Greek government's lapses in safeguarding Mount Athos raise significant concerns, especially regarding the enduring illegal occupation of Esphigmenou Monastery by individuals masquerading as monks and squatting at the monastery for decades.

​In contemplating Orthodoxy’s intricate past, we uncover the complex interplay of culture, religion, and politics that have shaped Orthodoxy's historical and religious narratives.

​In the grand tapestry of Orthodox Christianity, the Muscovite church's insatiable expansionism strives to assert authority over the entire ecclesiastical and political realm. Since the 15th century, this far-fetched narrative has utilized deceit to undermine canonical ecclesiology. As in modern Ukraine, the Moscow Patriarch seeks to delegitimize the local Church, thereby making their desired territory available for ecclesiastic invasion. The Moscow Patriarchate's trajectory toward apostasy has reached its culmination, prompting Orthodox observers, theologians, and historians to grapple with deciphering and clarifying for the layman an understanding of the Moscow Patriarchate’s problematic evil conduct.
​

​A conspicuous derivative of Moscow's ecclesial abuse is their audacious claim to be "the rightful heir to Orthodox leadership." Embedded in this assertion is a language replete with falsehoods and deceit. An heir, by definition, is "legally entitled to the rank of another on that person's death." Yet, when did the thrones of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem meet their demise? Quite the opposite unfolded – they flourished as part of the Great Nation, the Great Church of Christ.
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The Muscovite church consistently avoids adherence to canonical law and abuses its spiritual authority. She heavily depended on the political power wielded by ruling entities such as the czarist, Stalinist, and current Putin regimes. This alliance with political forces transforms the Church into a tool for oppressing the population rather than serving as a source of spiritual guidance. 
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​The Church, aligned with the Kremlin, aims to expand its influence by seeking to conquer and control territories deemed as barbarian, displaying an insatiable appetite for expansion and disregarding canonical law. Moscow's approach involves labeling certain regions as "barbarian," providing a perceived legitimacy for Russian ecclesiastical conquest. This strategy has historical precedence, evidenced by Moscow's past uncanonical "missionizing" efforts in Asia and North America.
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Despite the oppressive constraints imposed by the Ottoman Empire on the Rum Millet, the Great Church of Christ has thrived under excruciatingly constricting conditions. From the 15th to the 19th centuries, the Churches of the Great Nation, namely Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Cyprus, experienced remarkable growth and spiritual development under the umbrella of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In doing so, they embodied and secured the sacred essence of the Great Church of Christ and safeguarded the Traditions of the church fathers, in contrast to the Russian alterations and innovations to the Church's inheritance. 

​The consistently abusive Russian Church, ego-driven by opportunism, boldly asserted its autonomy, departing from canonical law at every self-serving opportunity, as in the unilateral alteration of its title to the Metropolitan of Moscow and all of Russia. This action signaled the beginning of the Russian Church's self-isolation, accompanied by an irrationally detrimental Russkiy Mir mentality. Russia's ecclesiastic abuses extended beyond heretics or enemies of the faith, encompassing anyone perceived as a threat to the Russkiy mir mentality.

​Case in point: Michael Trivolis was born around 1475 in Arta, then part of the Ottoman Empire; Michael hailed from a noble family with connections to the fallen Byzantine emperor in Constantinople. His father, Manuel, held the title of Archon Voivode. Michael became a monk, taking the name Maximos. He embarked on his educational journey on the island of Corfu under the tutelage of John Moschos and John Laskaris. Later, he joined Laskaris in Florence during the 1490s and continued his studies across Italian cities such as Bologna, Florence, Ferrara, Milan, Padua, and Venice, all infused with scholars who fled Constantinople.

​In 1515, Rus' Grand Prince Basil sought a monk from the Ecumenical Patriarchate to translate religious texts. His All Holiness Theoleptus I decided to send the energetic Maximos from Vatopedi Monastery on Mount Athos in 1518. After years of labor, in 1525, a Russian sobor accused Holy Maximos of nonconformism and heresy. Consequently, Maximos was exiled to the Volokolamsk Monastery, confined to a dungeon without the right to correspond. False allegations continued during a new sobor in 1531, resulting in a ban on receiving communion for the next two decades.

​Despite combined efforts from the Patriarchs of the Great Nation, including appeals from the Ecumenical Patriarch, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, attempts to negotiate Maximos' release with Russian authorities proved futile. Maximos ultimately fell asleep in 1556 at the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Lavra in Sergiyev Posad. Saint Maximos the Greek’s memory is commemorated on January 21st in Orthodox churches worldwide. 

​Despite this and numerous other crimes against Orthodoxy, in 1589, Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremias II officially recognized Moscow's canonical status, favoring it by raising Job to the dignity of a patriarch.
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The preferential treatment given to the local metropolitan of Moscow originated from a situation involving manipulation and coercion. Specifically, this involved the blackmail and imprisonment of the Ecumenical Patriarch, who was subjected to house arrest in Moscow until he consented to Russian demands. The Russian Church continues to employ, to this day, a strategy characterized by coercion and threats across diverse situations, maintaining a consistent approach to exerting influence and control.

Amidst the wars and tumult of 1685, ecclesiastic territories within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were temporarily transferred from the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the Moscow Patriarchate. The historical record attests to Moscow's failure to adhere to the terms of this transfer, reflecting a persistent pattern of the MP breaking agreements. Nevertheless, the legitimate Russian Patriarchate's existence was relatively brief. In 1721, Peter the Great dismantled the legal ecclesiastic institution, the "Moscow Patriarchate," and in its place, he established a Western-style bishop's college, modeled after the College of Cardinals, which eventually evolved into a Synod-based church administered by a lay director or Ober-Procurator.

​Under Peter's rule, a new ecclesiastic educational system addressed the often insufficient education of local priests and monks. However, the enlightened curriculum, heavily influenced by the West with an emphasis on Latin language and subjects, came at the cost of limited exposure to liturgical Greek heritage, Eastern Church Fathers, and Slavonic church languages. Despite formal education, training monks and priests for ministry to a Russian-speaking population could have been more comprehensive.
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During this era, a distinctive form of Russo-centric ecclesiastic education emerged, representing a significant departure from the ancient Hellenic idealism traditionally associated with Eastern Rome. This marked a profound shift in 1600 years of Orthodoxy towards de-Hellenization, where the influence of classical Eastern Church traditions began to wane from the ancient Hellenic heritage to a Russkiy Mir mentality. What distinguished this period was the unprecedented phenomenon of Russian culture actively shaping the development of the church, a departure from the historical norm where the church typically played a pivotal role in informing and influencing the culture. This shift reflected a departure from the ancient roots of Eastern Orthodoxy and the emergence of a unique, ethnically grounded Orthodoxy, redefining the dynamics between the church and culture. This restructuring of the Orthodox ethos included a neo-classical influence evident in iconography, architecture, and music and even extended to ancient Orthodox centers through transmission from Mount Athos. The infiltration of this deleterious mindset by Russky Mir has had far-reaching consequences. Yet, in recent decades, efforts to expunge these principles from the authentic phronema have been evident worldwide, except within Russia.

​This St Petersburg Synod persisted until 1917. Significantly, a considerable number of bishops, lacking canonical lineage extending beyond Moscow's defined canonically legitimate borders, came together to convene the infamous All-Russian Local Council. They established an innovative, structured Patriarchal administration in an autonomous decision-making process. The former American Archbishop Tikhon assumed leadership, but the Council's work and decrees were stifled in Russia with the ascendency of the Bolsheviks. This marks a somber chapter in Orthodoxy as the Russian Church grapples with its ties to the Soviet state, characterized by unsuccessful post-revolution ecclesiastical reforms and relentless attempts by the Communist regime to suppress or control the Church.
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The selfless acts of Christian martyrs, the challenges posed by a lack of unified Church authority, and the internal conflicts among Russian church movements —such as the Living Church, Church Abroad, Catacomb Church, ROCOR, and others— are intricate aspects of this historical narrative. The complication deepened with the usurpation of Church power by Metropolitan Sergius in 1927. Additionally, the Church's active engagement in the cult of Stalin further adds complexity, ultimately leading to the establishment, orchestrated by Stalin himself, of the present-day Russian "Patriarchate" in 1943. The first Simulacrum Patriarch installed by Stalin was Sergios, followed by Alexy I, Pimen, Alexy II, and Cyril.

​The Russian Church adopted a distinctive approach to inter-Orthodox interaction, characterized by unilateral declarations that labeled nonconformists as impostors and subjected them to anathema. Indeed, the non-dogmatic application of schism is acknowledged as a distinctive characteristic unique to the Russian Orthodox tradition. With a simple stroke of the pen, Moscow labeled all bishops who opposed them as non-canonical, a Russian stratagem. As a reminder, in recent years, the simulacrum patriarch of Moscow Cyril extended this illegitimate unilateral approach to declare entire global communities, including the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Patriarchate of Alexandria, the churches of Cyprus and Greece, and selected bishops as heretics. This craftily devious and lamentably illicit ecclesiastical maneuver not only falsely legitimized Cyril's unlawful expansion but also effectively consolidated the establishment of exarchates, thereby significantly amplifying Russia's geopolitical influence across the globe. Truly unworthy!
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​The unjust exploitation of anathema is considered a deeply sinful act and is deemed incomprehensible by a Patriarchal Synod except in dogmatic matters. From my perspective, an official synodal act involving the denial of truth, ridicule, misinterpretation, or any effort to diminish fellow autocephalous churches warrants a formal denunciation. The act of leveraging the gravity and importance of the Church's anathemas to justify an ecclesiastic invasion and fratricide is inherently satanic in nature.
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Ultimately, the ancient churches, bound by the obligations of the Ecumenical Councils, are obliged to assess the standing of the Russian Church and its influence on Traditional Orthodox ecclesiastic conduct. These overtly anti-Orthodox Russkiy Mir leanings mandate reevaluating Moscow's title "patriarch" and arriving at a decision, establishing a sacred Russian church by legitimate Orthodox standards rather than a fratricidal one established by Stalin.

​The connection is profound, marked by a symbiotic relationship that some perceive as parasitic while others consider commensalism. Regardless of the viewpoint, it is evident that the Russian people are firmly entwined in this intricate and incestuous Church-State relationship, with no discernible alternative reality, since the inception of the Muscovite church, which customarily pursues its desires without concern for consequences.

​In defiance of Orthodox Canons, Moscow's primary driving force appears to be rooted in ego, as evidenced by a series of actions, including self-initiation, unilateral declarations of self-rule or autocephaly, and the self-assertion of Patriarchal titles. These actions span various historical moments, including the unauthorized relocation of the canonical Throne from Kyiv to Vladimir to Moscow in 1325, the pivotal illegal event in 1448, when Jonah became Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus', and unilaterally changed his title to "Metropolitan of Moscow and all Russia" during his tenure eventually declared autocephaly a historical first self-appointed autocephaly, the acquisition of the Patriarchal title through questionable means in 1448, the self-authorized expansion beyond the territory integrity authorized in Golden Tomos, self-initiated establishment of a patriarchate in 1917, and the controversial reestablishment in 1943. These actions and numerous other "de facto" assumptions collectively clearly violate Orthodox Canons.

Throughout history, Russian ecclesiology has relied on extortion and the "de facto" method of ecclesiology. This “Russian de facto ecclesiology” implies that Russian Orthodox practices or the prevailing status quo often deviate from Orthodox phronema, irrespective of their adherence to or conformity with canonical norms.
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The Russian Orthodox Church has firmly established itself within the Russian government in charge (Czar, Soviet, modern). To understand this connection, we must trace its origins to the Christianization of Kievan Rus' in 988. During that period, Moscow was a remote, insignificant backwater town on the western outskirts of the subordinate Vladimir-Suzdal principality. Its reputation was limited to serving as a gathering point for ruffians, lacking significance as a power hub with no culture or valuable assets.

​It wasn't until 1263 that a Rus nobleman, Daniel, inherited this territory, and it took until 1282 for him to be self-recognized as an independent prince of Moscow. Interestingly, despite Moscow's relatively peripheral status, Muscovite princes began styling themselves as "Byzantine Princes." Over time, they expanded through conquest and territorial acquisition; this self-granted title evolved into "the (Megas) Grand Prince Sovereign of Moscow and all Rus."

In 1308, Boleslaw-Yuri II of Galicia, King of Ruthenia, nominated Peter for the vacant position of Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus', a role that was subsequently appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Peter embarked on a journey to Constantinople, where Patriarch Athanasius consecrated him as the Metropolitan of Kyiv, outfitting him with the requisite hierarchal vestments, staff, and paperwork for Kyiv. After a year-long absence, Metropolitan Peter returned to Rus' in 1308, first arriving in Kyiv and later proceeding to Vladimir.
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However, tensions escalated when the Grand Prince of Vladimir and Tver, Mikhail Yaroslavich, attempted to promote his preferred candidate for this prestigious position. Peter's appointment ignited prolonged animosity between Mikhail and Peter, leading to a situation where Peter sought protection from the Prince of Moscow in 1325. This began the Church-state relationship that evolved into the Russian Orthodox Church. Metropolitan Peter then unilaterally relocated his metropolitan throne from Kyiv to Vladimir. Subsequently, in 1325, following negotiations with the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan Kalita, Metropolitan Peter once again, without canonical approval, moved the metropolitan cathedra (chair) from Vladimir to Moscow as part of a mutually beneficial agreement inaugurating centuries of Russian abuse of canon law.

​The embryonic court of Muscovite Russia's cultural influences were deeply rooted in Kyiv and the (Roman) Byzantine cultural milieus, as it lacked a distinct cultural identity beyond warlike character, emerging from a confluence of illiterate Slavic tribes. In this context, supernatural beliefs and practices were, and still are, integral to daily life in Muscovite Russia.

In 1339, Ivan rebuilt the Kremlin in oak, becoming the royal court's residence, including church authorities and local self-appointed bishop. In 1366, Dmitri Donskoi replaced the oak palisade with a strong citadel of white limestone, which became the foundation of the current walls encompassing Moscow's royal court and bishopric. From 1370 to 1650, the Russian Church was crucial in developing the Russian state. Throughout this era, the Russian Church occupied a privileged status, even as some areas of Russia were under Mongol rule from the 13th to the 15th century. The Church played a pivotal role in aiding the nation in enduring the years of Tartar oppression and promoting economic and spirituality.
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Around 1656, the Kremlin housed a Patriarchal residence and military barracks, and since then, this amalgamation has played a central role in Russian religious and political affairs. Today, the Kremlin's distinctive twelve golden domes and the adjoining Church of the Twelve Apostles remain prominent even though the Patriarch no longer resides within its walls. The Russian Church and military work in tandem to establish Russian outposts for commerce

​By 1721, Peter the Great abolished the corrupt and politically influential patriarchate and introduced a new synodal system governed by the Czar's representatives. It wasn't until 1917 that a Patriarchate was unilaterally reestablished, again adopting a "De Facto" approach. It was the first instance in history where Orthodox hierarchs in Moscow granted itself authority that did not exist, with a synod claiming a self-anointed Patriarchal title and resorting to extortion to maintain this pseudo-legitimacy. Whatever their intentions, this short-lived endeavor led to numerous anti-Moscow Russian sects sprouting up around the globe that further diverged from orthodox practices.

​As the heir to Peter's vision of Western acceptance, the 1770s marked the beginning of another challenge to Orthodoxy as the Russian Orthodox Church imbedded in a symbiotic relationship with corrupt state authorities. This trend became particularly pronounced with the ascent of Catherine "the Great" to the Russian throne, who willingly utilized the synodal apparatus. Having been influenced by Kyivan and Constantinople court traditions, Catherine continued to look to the West for recognition and support. Witnessing the transformative changes in the Western world, she sought to modernize Russian society. Her efforts commenced with architectural developments, embracing Neoclassical architecture.

​Subsequently, art transformed, starting with a vibrant introduction of religious art distinct from Orthodox Liturgical iconography. Even traditional iconography was influenced by this new paradigm, leading to its gradual displacement. This influence extended even to Mount Athos, where the adoption of the unique style was vigorously promoted, benefiting significantly from the financial support provided by Russia. All the while, it was contaminating our Orthodox inheritance.
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The 18th century witnessed the emergence of "starchestvo" under the Ukrainian-born Paisius Velichkovsky and his followers at the Optina Monastery, Russia's last stronghold of Constantinopolitan Orthodox Athonite traditions. Though not immune to the neoclassic artistic influences, this signaled the commencement of a profound spiritual reawakening within the Russian Church following an extended phase of modernization, which would further the 19th-century fin-de-siècle political upheavals culminating in the Bolshevik revolution.

​To illustrate how Russian soft power worked in 1842, thanks to the patronage of Tsar Nicolas I of Russia. Let us see how Russkiy Mir infiltrated Mount Athos by expanding a simple monastic cell known as St. Anthony right outside the capitol center of Athos, Karyes. This expansion led to Patriarch Anthimus IV of Constantinople recognizing the St. Anthony Cell as a skete in 1849. The term "skete" was chosen in adherence to the customs and regulations of Mount Athos, which prohibited the establishment of new monasteries beyond those of the Byzantine era as the skete continued to grow, both in terms of the number of monastics and its physical presence, a central church was erected in honor of Saint Andrew in 1867. This Church was consecrated in 1900 by Patriarch Joachim III of Constantinople. This Church is the largest on Mount Athos and ranks among the largest in the Balkans. Soon thereafter, Moscow took control of the ancient Kyivan monastery of St Pantelimon and, by 1913, had over 2,000 monks installed on the Kyivan premises. Eventually erasing Ukrainian identity presence from Holy Athos. Monks were no longer allowed to use the Ukrainian language, replaced with Russian, the sole language of the Moscow Patriarchate, irrespective of the traditional Orthodox use of the vernacular.  

​In just a few decades, the commissioning of thousands of Neoclassic icons from various ateliers nearly eradicated millennia-old traditions. The systematic erasure of Hellenic Romiosini's heritage by Moscow continues today, reflecting Russia's expansive soft power reach from Estonia to Sinai, including Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, Cyprus, and the entire Great Nation under Constantinople's Omophorion. Moscow's relentless pursuit of altering the Orthodox Ethos is a battle it fervently embraces.
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The Orthodox mindset, known as phronema, was so profoundly infected and manipulated by this new Neoclassical Russian influence that it took a century for a significant shift. It was only when American restorers began their work on Agia Sophia and Chora, coinciding with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the fall of the Czardom, the emergence of visionary Ecumenical Patriarchs, and the individual contributions of artists like Fotis Kontoglou, Stylianos Kartakes, Leonid Uspensky, and others who rediscovered authentic iconography on Mount Athos, and a revival of Byzantine prototypes embraced universally. This revival manifested in various facets of culture, including art, architecture, intellectual thought, musical composition, and notation… This cleansing continues in the Orthodox world today. I will explore this in another essay.

​It wasn't until 1943, during Stalin's reign, that the Russian Church was reestablished. After instilling a new canon, the practice of informing on one's neighbors within the Church, Stalin deliberately selected the former Nazi Germany embassy in Moscow as the Patriarch's residence. This move was a deliberate message to the Russian Orthodox Church, suggesting that, in Stalin's eyes, their authority was not substantially superior to that of the Nazis. To this day, the Patriarch continues to reside in the same building. However, Patriarch Cyril has invested a substantial amount, at least 40 million dollars, in constructing a lavish private residential compound, one of many.
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The difference is the inherent Soviet Russian Church is substantially more potent than it has ever been in history. The "extortionist de facto" ecclesiology of the Russian Orthodox Church dominates the processes by which it rules Moscow. The list of corruption is long and unjust. Since Cyril has been in office since 2009, not including the many wristwatch or cigarette scandals Cyril is engaged in, he has utilized many uncanonical egregious conspiracies in leading the Russian Church. Here are recent examples:

​Today, criminal activities persist within the Russian Church. Bearing similarities to the mafia, in a striking parallel, the Russian Orthodox Church employs tactics reminiscent of Nazi and Soviet propaganda, wherein the magnitude of falsehoods makes them difficult to challenge or dispute the facts presented, given their endorsement and promotion by the "Holy Orthodox" Church. The simulacrum Patriarch Cyril's cathedra has directly emulated Goebbels' playbook, further exacerbating the situation.
 

 
Within Orthodoxy, a narrative - voiced solely by Russian hierarchical circles - persists that seeks to equate the Ecumenical Patriarchate's privileges, those endowed by the ecumenical councils, with actions similar in intent to Roman Catholicism's Papal throne (infallibility) as many Russkiy mir bishops retorted a few years back: “If we wanted a pope, we'd go to the real one.” Nevertheless, in this narrative lies a profound truth that transcends theological discourse: the recognition that no institution, no matter how revered or esteemed, is immune to the human frailty of fallibility. Recognizing these imperfections, we embark on a journey to explore the seldom-discussed moments when the venerable Ecumenical Patriarchate, a paragon of wisdom and righteousness, succumbed to worldly fallible judgment. Through the annals of history, we unveil these compelling episodes with a measured dose of introspection, discernment, and a commitment to the pursuit of truth.
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​In the historical interactions between the Mother Church, the Patriarchate of Constantinople-New Rome, and Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the local Russian Church, there have certainly been moments seasoned with the occasional blunder, often prejudiced by the ominous specter of threats and violence. Here are some examples:

​Succumbing to Moscow's Manipulative Tactics: 
One glaring example is the concession made by the Ecumenical Patriarchate while under duress in Moscow. In this unique scenario, the Church granted the title of Patriarch to the local Bishop of Moscow. This lapse, which occurred, was induced by Russian pressure, kidnapping, and blackmail. This episode exposed Moscow's proclivity for exploiting vulnerable epochs of the Pentarchy. It is crucial to clarify that the Ecumenical Patriarchate's actions were a response to Moscow's demands and threats of violence, not an act of subservience to the laughable "Third Rome" model, as is often rumored.
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The historical record reveals a troubling pattern of the Moscow Patriarchate aligning itself with various war efforts. Delving into historical instances where the "Church of Russia" endorses nationalistic fervor during wartime conflicts, this alignment with nationalist sentiments is a recurring theme throughout Russian history: spanning the Czarist era, the Soviet period, and contemporary times. The "Church of Russia" consistently finds itself immersed in the fervor of nationalist sentiments.

For instance, the Russian Church's divisive propaganda extended beyond Russia, notably in Bulgaria, culminating in the significant Ethnophyletism Council of Constantinople in September 1872. Following this failure in Russian church diplomacy, the Kremlin's Church threw its support behind the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, using sermons to rally for war efforts. Critics argue that such involvement in promoting patriotic zeal during wartime contradicts the fundamental principles of Orthodox Christianity, which stress peace, compassion, and reconciliation.
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This pattern of alignment with nationalist fervor underscores the need for ethical scrutiny in assessing the actions of the Moscow Patriarchate across different historical contexts.

​Rogue Churches and Lies: 
The proliferation of falsehoods disseminated by rogue churches like ROCOR (Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia) is a cause for concern. The role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has consistently been one of benevolence, aimed at maintaining dialogue and order within the Orthodox Church. This commitment to stability and unity persists despite historical distortions and misinformation from rebellious Russian factions.
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The nurturing embrace of the Patriarch of Constantinople and the duplicitous nature of the Russian Hierarchy, whether within the Moscow Patriarchate founded during Stalin's era or among the countless separated factions, has always been a source of strife for Orthodoxy. This contention stems from Moscow's seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of divisive actions.

​Stalinist Influence: 
In 1943, it allowed the Stalinist-founded Church to assert itself as the legitimate Moscow Patriarchate and Russian Orthodox Church and permitted it to operate with impunity throughout the turbulent 20th century. The 21st century vividly illustrates Moscow's capacity for sowing chaos within the Universal Orthodox Church. This occurred amid a conspicuous silence from the Pentarchy.
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The stance taken by the Ecumenical Patriarchate during this period was driven by a commitment to preserving Orthodox unity and stability rather than an endorsement of Moscow's actions. This position persisted for decades until proper church order began to be restored, notably with the elevation of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. Since then, His All-Holiness has become the primary target of repulsive accusations and direct hostility from Moscow. This underscores the extent to which Russia has become a focal point in the ongoing ecclesiastical disputes.

​Appeasement to Moscow Sycophants: 
The frequent practice of appeasement towards Moscow's demands, exemplified by establishing Assemblies of Bishops to oversee the Church's organization in so-called "barbarian territories," brings into focus not the ambiguity of the canons but Moscow's underlying intentions; this is further underscored by Russo-centric churches withdrawing from these global assemblies, often over non-dogmatic issues.

​With unwavering resolve, I denounce the uncanonical and illicit actions of the Church of Russia. Incredibly, despite their transgressions, they audaciously proclaim that Eucharistic intercommunion with sister Churches like Constantinople, Alexandria, Cyprus, Greece, and any dissenting body is now deemed impossible for Hierarchy, Clergy, and Laity alike until these ancient and once-glorious Churches repent —a demand that stands in stark contradiction to Orthodox tradition.

Such actions cast a long shadow over the integrity of the Russian Church. They underscored the pressing need to thoroughly examine Moscow's motives and tactics in its uncanonical ecclesiastical pursuits. These pursuits represent an alarming departure from established Orthodox norms and principles. What is particularly striking is Russia's penchant for going beyond even the most questionable practices, resorting to falsehoods and ecclesial distortions. In this process, they frequently deflect blame onto the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its spiritual leader, His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.
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In conclusion, my support for the Ecumenical Patriarchate remains unwavering, and my criticisms are firmly directed at the simulacrum Moscow Patriarchate, an institution more than often engaged in questionable ecclesiastical practices, divisive tactics, and propaganda. I raise my voice to condemn the actions of the Russian Church throughout history, which unabashedly continues with enthusiasm today. I offer my heartfelt prayers for the continued holy efforts of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as they tirelessly strive for unity and unwavering faith in the sacred traditions of Orthodoxy. May their sacrificial dedication to preserving the true faith serve as a beacon of hope and reconciliation for all Orthodox believers.

​There is a prevailing belief that the simulacrum Patriarch Cyril is utilized as a significant soft power tool over-lorded by Putin. However, a closer examination reveals a different reality: Cyril effectively controls Putin, making him his puppet. Why are we told Cyril's actions often "seem to align" with the interests of Putin, whereas the truth reveals Putin is at the mercy of what can only be described as a "megalomaniac monk." The rhetoric of the simulacrum patriarch Cyril aims to inspire and rally Putin's Russian geopolitical war. Cyril acting under the guise of "raison d'église" (reason of the church), in reality, is "raison d'état" (reason of the state).

​Delving into the historical context and examining the power dynamics between Putin and Cyril is essential. A study of Cyril's actions and alignment with Putin's objectives can further prove this puppeteer-puppet relationship. Exploring the institution's resilience in the post-Soviet era and its theological justifications can help substantiate the assertion of its enduring legitimacy.
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Recent revelations illustrate how deep the Soviet system is in play. While in the KGB, Vladimir Putin was subordinate to Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev (Patriarch Cyril). Gundyayev was influential and was the oligarch who profited from cigarette sales using the church as cover, and Putin claims mystical ties with Cyril. Putin publicly claims Patriarch Cyril's father secretly baptized him in Leningrad in the newly established "Patriarchate" by Stalin.

Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev was "extremely political and in direct contact with the KGB because it regularly communicated with religious figures and political authorities in other countries. The clergymen in the section had to 'make full reports whenever they return from travels abroad and after any contact with foreign delegations,' says Nivière.

​Following the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s, a Russian parliamentary commission investigating the KGB's activities deemed Putin’s superior; the agent then known as "Mikhailov" is the man now known as Russian Patriarch Cyril. 'These elements all lead to a strong suspicion of ties between the KGB and a Russian Church that was, during that period, very much under control and surveillance."
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Understanding the historical and theological context is crucial to appreciating this nuanced dynamic. The irony lies in the church's aspiration to revive a czarist Russia, considering that the Patriarch of Moscow held minimal to no power at all during that period. This decline in authority dates back before 1721 when the legitimate or at least the canonically acknowledged Patriarchate was abolished and persisted despite the substantial efforts, even in 1917, of the so-called American Archbishop and the future Russian saint, Tikhon.

​"Like Vladimir Putin at the state level, Patriarch Cyril has imposed a top-down power structure in the Russian Orthodox Church since 2009. He makes all the decisions, which are passed down to the bishops. He imposes his will and his choices," says Nivière.
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As we've all seen since Russia invaded Ukraine, Patriarch Cyril has fervently supported the Russian president's choices. He has given several sermons and blessed Russian troops while denouncing Ukrainian authorities in a homily delivered on February 27, 2022; the head of the Russian Orthodox Church qualified those fighting against the "historical unity" of Russia and Ukraine as "forces of evil." At the end of September, he asserted in a sermon that those killed while fulfilling their military "duty" have "committed a sacrifice that washes away all sin." Since Cyril's elevation to the leadership of Stalin's Russian Patriarchy, he has been entangled in multiple scandals. These controversies have marred the reputation of “Patriarch” and currently taints Orthodoxy worldwide. The MP's legitimacy has been asserted through the application of the principle of "economia" by the Ancient Patriarchs, allowing it to maintain its influence and authority, a decision which needs to be reevaluated by the leadership of the Ancient Orthodox Church.

​This Russian flock deserves to receive unvarnished truths from the ancient patriarchates. However, it is noteworthy that only Constantinople, Alexandria, Cyprus, and Greece have voiced their concerns thus far. Interestingly, these patriarchates have faced anathemas from Stalin's Moscow Church, underscoring the challenging dynamics within the Orthodox community's status quo.
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We're told Cyril supports Putin's government. The truth is far more insidious: the family policy, the Crimea Invasion, the military campaign in Syria, attempts to cancel Council Crete, the Russian Church's Self-isolation named Schism, the Ukrainian Invasion, undue influence on Mount Athos, tainting theological efforts, etc.

​Indeed, Cyril projects the image of an influential figure who relishes the trappings of opulence and comfort. Surprisingly, despite his monastic calling, he does not appear to be associated with a penchant for asceticism. An interesting observation is that in video footage of both Putin and Cyril, even during church services, Putin seems to move without visible secret service protection, while Cyril is not only escorted by a sizable and heavily armed contingent of secret service personnel but also includes undercover agents and individuals posing as deacons. This striking contrast further underscores the stark differences in their public personas and the distinct security protocols they maintain.
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In summary, it is not Putin who wields power over the simulacrum Patriarch but Cyril who exerts control over Putin, shaping his actions and policies to serve a particular antichrist agenda.

Θέλω να ευχαριστήσω τον κ. Γκουγλάκη για τη μετάφραση. Ενημερώστε με αν υπάρχουν λάθη...
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Με έμπλεξαν σε μια παράλογη ανταλλαγή με ένα απροσδόκητο κόμμα: την αυτοκέφαλη Εκκλησία της Αλβανίας. Ο ισχυρισμός μου ότι οι «Διεθνείς Ολιγάρχες» συμβάλλουν στην ανοικοδόμηση της κατεστραμμένης ορθόδοξης εκκλησίας συναντήθηκε με αντίσταση. Παραμένω ακλόνητος στην ακλόνητη πεποίθησή μου ότι αυτή η πρόταση είναι έγκυρη και ωφέλιμη για τα Τίρανα, εφόσον δεν συμβαίνουν κακόβουλες δραστηριότητες.

Επιπλέον, υποστηρίζω ότι η Αλβανική Εκκλησία πρέπει να ανακατευθύνει τις παθιασμένες προσπάθειές της προς την αντιμετώπιση του πραγματικού ζητήματος εντός της Ορθοδοξίας: του ομοιώματος πατριάρχη Κύριλλου. Αυτή η εκτροπική εστίαση σε έναν ταπεινό αγιογράφο από τη Φλόριντα είναι μια άστοχη προσπάθεια να εκτραπεί η προσοχή από πιο σοβαρές παραβάσεις κατά της ανθρωπότητας.

Ως αποτέλεσμα, αποφάσισα να μην συμμετάσχω στις μικροανταλλαγές που ξεκίνησε η Αλβανική Σύνοδος και ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος Αναστάσιος. Αντίθετα, θα απευθύνω τις ανησυχίες και τα σχόλιά μου προς τη Μόσχα, όπου τα βασικά ζητήματα αξίζουν προσοχής. Σε αντίθεση με την κοινή αντίληψη, είναι κρίσιμο να αναγνωρίσουμε ότι η καθιέρωση του Πατριάρχη Μόσχας και Πασών των Ρωσιών από τον Στάλιν ως θεσμός έχει αντέξει πέρα από την κατάρρευση του σοβιετικού συστήματος. Γιατί αλλιώς ο Πούτιν θα ακολουθούσε πρωτοβουλίες όπως η κατασκευή ενός φρικτού καθεδρικού ναού πολέμου από λιωμένα τανκς και διατάγματα, η διάδοση της αντικανονικής αίρεσης του ρωσικού κόσμου στην Ορθοδοξία και η προώθηση της έννοιας του αντικανονικού όπου υπάρχουν Ρώσοι, υπάρχει και η Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία;

Επικρατεί η πεποίθηση ότι ο προσομοιωτής Πατριάρχης Κύριλλος χρησιμοποιείται ως σημαντικό εργαλείο μαλακής δύναμης που υπερκυριεύεται από τον Πούτιν. Ωστόσο, μια πιο προσεκτική εξέταση αποκαλύπτει μια διαφορετική πραγματικότητα: ο Σύριλλος ελέγχει ουσιαστικά τον Πούτιν, καθιστώντας τον μαριονέτα του. Γιατί μας λένε ότι οι ενέργειες του Κύριλλου συχνά «μοιάζουν να ευθυγραμμίζονται» με τα συμφέροντα του Πούτιν, ενώ η αλήθεια αποκαλύπτει ότι ο Πούτιν βρίσκεται στο έλεος αυτού που μπορεί να περιγραφεί μόνο ως «μεγαλομανής μοναχός». Η ρητορική του προσομοιωτή πατριάρχη Κυρίλλου στοχεύει να εμπνεύσει και να συσπειρώσει τον ρωσικό γεωπολιτικό πόλεμο του Πούτιν. Ο Κύριλλος που ενεργεί με το πρόσχημα του "raison d'église" (λόγος της εκκλησίας), στην πραγματικότητα, είναι "raison d'état" (λόγος του κράτους).

Η εμβάθυνση στο ιστορικό πλαίσιο και η εξέταση της δυναμικής ισχύος μεταξύ Πούτιν και Κύριλλου είναι απαραίτητη. Μια μελέτη των πράξεων του Κύριλλου και η ευθυγράμμιση με τους στόχους του Πούτιν μπορεί να αποδείξει περαιτέρω αυτή τη σχέση μαριονέτας-μαριονέτας. Η διερεύνηση της ανθεκτικότητας του ιδρύματος στη μετασοβιετική εποχή και των θεολογικών του δικαιολογιών μπορεί να βοηθήσει στην τεκμηρίωση της διαρκούς νομιμότητάς του.

Οι πρόσφατες αποκαλύψεις δείχνουν πόσο βαθιά παίζει το σοβιετικό σύστημα. Ενώ βρισκόταν στην KGB, ο Βλαντιμίρ Πούτιν ήταν υποταγμένος στον Βλαντιμίρ Μιχαήλοβιτς Γκουντιάγιεφ (Πατριάρχης Κύριλλος). Ο Gundyayev είχε επιρροή και ήταν ο ολιγάρχης που κέρδιζε από τις πωλήσεις τσιγάρων χρησιμοποιώντας την εκκλησία ως κάλυψη, και ο Πούτιν ισχυρίζεται μυστικιστικούς δεσμούς με τον Κύριλλο. Ο Πούτιν ισχυρίζεται δημόσια ότι ο πατέρας του Πατριάρχη Κύριλλου τον βάφτισε κρυφά στο Λένινγκραντ στο νεοσύστατο «Πατριαρχείο» του Στάλιν.

Ο Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev ήταν "εξαιρετικά πολιτικός και σε άμεση επαφή με την KGB επειδή επικοινωνούσε τακτικά με θρησκευτικές προσωπικότητες και πολιτικές αρχές σε άλλες χώρες. Οι κληρικοί του τμήματος έπρεπε να "κάνουν πλήρεις αναφορές κάθε φορά που επέστρεφαν από ταξίδια στο εξωτερικό και μετά από οποιαδήποτε επαφή με ξένες αντιπροσωπείες», λέει ο Nivière.

Μετά την κατάρρευση της ΕΣΣΔ στις αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1990, μια ρωσική κοινοβουλευτική επιτροπή που ερευνούσε τις δραστηριότητες της KGB έκρινε τον ανώτερο του Πούτιν. ο πράκτορας τότε γνωστός ως «Μιχαήλοφ» είναι ο άνθρωπος που τώρα είναι γνωστός ως Ρώσος Πατριάρχης Κύριλλος. «Όλα αυτά τα στοιχεία οδηγούν σε μια ισχυρή υποψία για δεσμούς μεταξύ της KGB και μιας Ρωσικής Εκκλησίας που ήταν, κατά την περίοδο εκείνη, πολύ υπό έλεγχο και επιτήρηση».

Η κατανόηση του ιστορικού και θεολογικού πλαισίου είναι ζωτικής σημασίας για την εκτίμηση αυτής της διαφοροποιημένης δυναμικής. Η ειρωνεία βρίσκεται στη φιλοδοξία της εκκλησίας να αναβιώσει μια τσαρική Ρωσία, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι ο Πατριάρχης Μόσχας είχε ελάχιστη έως καθόλου εξουσία κατά τη διάρκεια αυτής της περιόδου. Αυτή η πτώση της εξουσίας χρονολογείται πριν από το 1721, όταν το νόμιμο ή τουλάχιστον το κανονικά αναγνωρισμένο Πατριαρχείο καταργήθηκε και παρέμεινε παρά τις ουσιαστικές προσπάθειες, ακόμη και το 1917, του λεγόμενου Αμερικανού Αρχιεπισκόπου και του μελλοντικού Ρώσου αγίου, Τίχωνα.

"Όπως ο Βλαντιμίρ Πούτιν σε κρατικό επίπεδο, ο Πατριάρχης Κύριλλος έχει επιβάλει μια δομή εξουσίας από πάνω προς τα κάτω στη Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία από το 2009. Παίρνει όλες τις αποφάσεις, οι οποίες μεταβιβάζονται στους επισκόπους. Επιβάλλει τη θέλησή του και τις επιλογές του". λέει ο Nivière.

Όπως όλοι έχουμε δει από τότε που η Ρωσία εισέβαλε στην Ουκρανία, ο Πατριάρχης Κύριλλος υποστήριξε ένθερμα τις επιλογές του Ρώσου προέδρου. Έκανε πολλά κηρύγματα και ευλόγησε τα ρωσικά στρατεύματα ενώ κατήγγειλε τις ουκρανικές αρχές σε μια ομιλία που έγινε στις 27 Φεβρουαρίου 2022. ο επικεφαλής της Ρωσικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας χαρακτήρισε όσους αγωνίζονται ενάντια στην «ιστορική ενότητα» Ρωσίας και Ουκρανίας ως «δυνάμεις του κακού». Στα τέλη Σεπτεμβρίου, υποστήριξε σε ένα κήρυγμα ότι όσοι σκοτώθηκαν ενώ εκπλήρωναν το στρατιωτικό τους «καθήκον» εκτάρια

Όπως όλοι είδαμε από τότε που η Ρωσία εισέβαλε στην Ουκρανία, ο Πατριάρχης Κύριλλος υποστήριξε σθεναρά τις επιλογές του Ρώσου προέδρου. Έκανε πολλά κηρύγματα και ευλόγησε τα ρωσικά στρατεύματα, ενώ κατήγγειλε τις ουκρανικές αρχές σε μια ομιλία που εκφωνήθηκε στις 27 Φεβρουαρίου 2022. Ο επικεφαλής της Ρωσικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας αποκάλεσε εκείνους που αγωνίζονται ενάντια στην «ιστορική ενότητα» Ρωσίας και Ουκρανίας ως «κακές δυνάμεις». Στα τέλη Σεπτεμβρίου, υποστήριξε σε ένα κήρυγμα ότι όσοι σκοτώθηκαν ενώ εκπλήρωναν το στρατιωτικό τους «καθήκον» είχαν «διαπράξει μια θυσία που ξεπλένει κάθε αμαρτία». Από την άνοδο του Κύριλλου στην ηγεσία του Ρωσικού Πατριαρχείου του Στάλιν, έχει εμπλακεί σε πολλαπλά σκάνδαλα. Αυτές οι αντιπαραθέσεις αμαύρωσαν τη φήμη του «Πατριάρχη» και βλάπτουν σήμερα την Ορθοδοξία παγκοσμίως. Η νομιμότητα του βουλευτή επιβεβαιώθηκε με την εφαρμογή της αρχής της «οικονομίας» από τα Αρχαία Πατριαρχεία, επιτρέποντάς του να διατηρήσει την επιρροή και την εξουσία του, απόφαση που πρέπει να επαναξιολογηθεί από την ηγεσία της Αρχαίας Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας.

Αυτό το ρωσικό ποίμνιο αξίζει να λάβει αλήθειες χωρίς βερνίκια από τα αρχαία πατριαρχεία. Ωστόσο, είναι αξιοσημείωτο ότι μόνο η Κωνσταντινούπολη, η Αλεξάνδρεια, η Κύπρος και η Ελλάδα έχουν εκφράσει τις ανησυχίες τους μέχρι στιγμής. Είναι ενδιαφέρον ότι αυτά τα πατριαρχεία αντιμετώπισαν αφορισμούς από την Εκκλησία του Στάλιν στη Μόσχα, υπογραμμίζοντας την προκλητική δυναμική εντός του status quo της Ορθόδοξης κοινότητας.

Μας λένε ότι ο Κύριλλος υποστηρίζει την κυβέρνηση του Πούτιν. Η αλήθεια είναι πολύ πιο ύπουλη: η οικογενειακή πολιτική, η εισβολή στην Κριμαία, η στρατιωτική εκστρατεία στη Συρία, οι προσπάθειες ματαίωσης του Συμβουλίου της Κρήτης, η αυτοαπομόνωση της Ρωσικής Εκκλησίας με το όνομα Σχίσμα, η ουκρανική εισβολή, η αδικαιολόγητη επιρροή στο Άγιο Όρος, θεολογικές προσπάθειες κ.λπ.

Πράγματι, ο Κύριλλος προβάλλει την εικόνα μιας ισχυρής φιγούρας που απολαμβάνει τις παγίδες της χλιδής και της άνεσης. Παραδόξως, παρά το μοναστικό του κάλεσμα, δεν φαίνεται να συνδέεται με κλίση στον ασκητισμό. Μια ενδιαφέρουσα παρατήρηση είναι ότι σε βίντεο του Πούτιν και του Κύριλλου, ακόμη και κατά τη διάρκεια των εκκλησιαστικών λειτουργιών, ο Πούτιν φαίνεται να κινείται χωρίς ορατή προστασία πληροφοριών, ενώ ο Κύριλλος όχι μόνο συνοδεύεται από μεγάλο και βαριά οπλισμένο προσωπικό πληροφοριών, αλλά περιλαμβάνει μυστικούς πράκτορες και άτομα που ποζάρουν ως διάκονοι. Αυτή η εντυπωσιακή αντίθεση υπογραμμίζει περαιτέρω τις έντονες διαφορές στα δημόσια πρόσωπα και τα διαφορετικά πρωτόκολλα ασφαλείας που διατηρούν.
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Συνοψίζοντας, δεν είναι ο Πούτιν που ασκεί την εξουσία πάνω στον ένστολο Πατριάρχη, αλλά ο Κύριλλος που ασκεί τον έλεγχο του Πούτιν, διαμορφώνοντας τις ενέργειες και τις πολιτικές του για να εξυπηρετήσει μια συγκεκριμένη ατζέντα του αντίχριστου.

Russian perception of Cyril

​Our beloved All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew says, “We call once again for an immediate end to the fratricidal war, which, like any war, undermines human dignity." And Patriarch Cyril says, dying in the fratricidal war against Ukraine "cleanses away all sins."

Archbishop Anastasios, you and those silent hierarchs are on the wrong side of history.

I feel compelled to address recent events. I have encountered harsh vile criticism and unfounded indictments in response to my seemingly harmless comment, even though my original intentions were precise as stated “Orthodox status quo.” It is disheartening to note that the individual who launched this public attack holds a position of the utmost influence. Unfortunately, Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos) of Tirana publicly engages in confrontations through his official synodal press office, often employing sarcasm and pandering to age-old racist biases, which is troubling enough.

​However censuring my statement "International Oligarchs," the synod’s silence vis-à-vis Moscow, directly condones and shields Patriarch Cyril's involvement in criminally uncanonical activities.

Saint Isaac the Syrian taught, “Silence is the sacrament of the world to come.”

This is Archbishop Anastasios' interpretation of 'silence'

​The Albanian synod’s silence advocates for actual bloodshed, epitomizing "Qui tacet consentit." These actions cast a shadow on Orthodox values and integrity, while the silence of other autocephalous churches underscores the importance of ethical standards in leadership roles. Those in influential positions must uphold these standards as their actions affect society's perception of ecclesiastical justice. 

​In Albania “between 1944 and 1985, the small Balkan nation was ruled by a strange, sociopathic, and, frankly, completely mad dictator named Enver Hoxha. While Stalinism effectively ended in Europe with the death of its namesake, or at least with the Khrushchev reforms that followed.” Clandestinely this influence continues unabated and unquestioned in many of the Orthodox Churches formally under Soviet control and currently in the sphere of the Kremlin’s man, “Patriarch” Cyril. 

​We all understand the Holy Spirit undeniably guides the Orthodox Church. It's disheartening to witness attempts that belittle lifelong servants of the Church, whether they are iconographers or Patriarchs. Such are the actions of the simulacrum Patriarch of Moscow Cyril who discourteously reminds His All Holiness of Christ's role as the Head of our Holy Orthodox Church undermining the Ecumenical Councils and church administration. These insults, among others, are met with silence from Archbishop Anastasios and other hierarchs.
​Let's choose respectful dialogue over derogatory language.

The Albanian Synod's most recent actions, involving an edited and modified press release, are deceptive attempts at justifying their stance through diversion. This release takes a personal dig at me. It employs a creative approach to criticize the Ecumenical Patriarch by emphasizing that "the Church of Ukraine has not been recognized... by nine other Autocephalous Orthodox Churches." It's important to note that this argument is a Russian talking point. This is not justification; it is petty and childish and has no bearing on canon law. And as in Estonia, the situation will resolve itself in time. Playing synodal word games with impunity is unnecessary and childish.

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1. The Dissembler's every word, and action, is an artifice laboring to conceal some [Russian] intention.
2. The Oligarch's domination of fellows in the opinions [Press], conduct, and manners of partisan despotism.
3. The Ruffian is distinguished by recklessness in which he witnesses atrocities [and stays silent].
4. The Fabricator of News to gratify his love of inventing and propagating [defensive] falsehoods.
5. The Shameless union of avarice and audacity produces a disregard for [ecclesial] decency and reputation.
6. The Petulant makes [Synodal Press] murmurings and rebukes when it cannot find reason.
7. The Suspicious man imputes a fraudulent intention to people [Ecumenical Patriarch]
8. The Proud men regard the [the Great Nation] with contempt; himself excepted.
   
9. The Detractor utters not a word that does not betray the malignancy of his [Russian] advocate.

A crucial question arises: why, in its recent alterations, hasn't in addition to the slight directed at the Ecumenical Patriarch the Albanian Synod neglected to acknowledge that only the Russian Church has self-isolated, altered sacred diptychs, and invaded ecclesiastic territories of other autocephalous churches? Furthermore, why hasn't Archbishop Anastasios acknowledged the historical evidence presented by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which supports Constantinople’s canonical and historical position in Ukraine?

​Archbishop Anastasios' silence regarding Patriarch Cyril's crimes against humanity and offenses against the Universal Church is compounded by notable correlations.  The Church of Russia is invading the ecclesial lands and the churches Anastasios was involved with during his youth. Beyond anathematizing several ancient patriarchates, the Russian Church vigorously expanded into East Africa, including Uganda where the then Father Anastasios celebrated his first Divine Liturgy in 1964, and Kenya where he officially inaugurated the Archbishop Makarios III Orthodox Patriarchal Seminary in Nairobi in 1982. These are particularly striking examples of numerous other instances further illustrating this point of “Russian influence.” While it may not suggest a conspiracy, the facts present a compelling case.

​I remember when, in 2001 Archbishop Anastasios received the Patriarch Athenagoras Award from the Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. National Commander Dr. Anthony J. Limberakis said, "The entire Order of St. Andrew is humbled by the opportunity to recognize this modern Orthodox missionary and humanitarian.” Today the same honoree mocks international Archons, as if putting on a noble mantle should be demeaned.
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Any educated person acknowledges the Moscow Church has always suffered from envy and as St. John Chrysostom says: “Envy is the mother of murder.” 

Lets repeat how we started"

Our beloved Ecumenical Patriarch says, “We call once again for an immediate end to the fratricidal war, which, like any war, undermines human dignity." And simulacrum Patriarch Kirill says dying in the fratricidal war against Ukraine "cleanses away all sins."
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Archbishop Anastasios, you and those silent hierarchs are on the wrong side of history.

It's important to note that discussing religious or cultural matters can be sensitive, and different people may have varying opinions on what changes or actions the Church of Albania might need. "Catharsis" typically refers to a process of emotional release or purification. In the context of the Church of Albania, this could be interpreted in various ways:

• Historical Context: The Church of Albania has a complex history, which includes periods of suppression and restoration. The church needs to confront and heal from its historical traumas or conflicts.
• Internal Reforms: The Church of Albania needs internal reforms or a renewal of its spiritual and moral values to cleanse itself from perceived impurities or Soviet corruption.
• Reconciliation: A need for reconciliation within the church or various communities within Orthodoxy.

The specific nature of the catharsis and the reasons behind this statement depend on the context and perspective from which it is made and how it is received.